User talk:Lysander

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Revision as of 23:47, 22 March 2015 by Lysander (talk | contribs)

Category Tree extension

Can you test this to make sure it is working properly? --Etenne (talk) 18:36, 21 March 2015 (UTC)

A hypothetical question...

Suppose that someone had left an easy-to-follow and very long trail of information on the Internet, some of which established his real-life identity.

Suppose that person was "a person of interest" for already having been convicted of certain crimes.

Suppose that person later made a statement on another forum which clearly established/admitted his guilt in "conspiring to violate" a law which was closely related to that which the person had earlier been convicted of -- something which could be expected to immediately draw the attention of the authorities, who most certainly were monitoring the site in question.

Suppose that same person purportedly sought to change his identity on a new forum he had joined, in order to avoid that trail following him. And suppose that this (purported) attempt was patently ineffective, as a simple search would establish.

Would such a person be liable to be pressured by the authorities into cooperating with the authorities in undermining activities on other forums which the authorities disapprove of?

Should a person in that a situation be trusted in administrative positions on other forums which the authorities disapprove of?

What do you think of the above, hypothetically speaking? User4 (talk) 18:03, 22 March 2015 (UTC)

I think that if you want to avoid any chance of problems, then you have to trust no one. Every subversive organization, or even potentially subversive organization, will tend to have government informants, who could either have been informants from the beginning, or could have started out as legitimate members and then been "turned," perhaps through blackmail. These agents have nothing better to do with their time and huge budgets than set up surveillance and stings wherever they can. It's certainly an easier way to rack up arrests and successful prosecutions than to go after people who are actually a danger to the public.
It seems hopeless to try to identify the informants or potential informants. They will do whatever is necessary to blend in and distract attention from themselves, including pointing the finger at others. Lysander (talk) 21:20, 22 March 2015 (UTC)
Whether it is totally useless or not to try to identify informants or potential informants is debatable - in the past, some organizations have been able to reliably do so.
Of course, it is impossible to eliminate all risk -- as you say, they have virtually limitless resources to draw upon, and they can "turn" people who otherwise had been trustworthy.
Part of their "plan" is to plant the seeds of distrust within members, and -- if this is not carefully combated by the organizational leaders -- it can lead (and has led!) to total disruption of a group. Still, the maxim stands: Trust, but Verify.
I have often wondered why, in the case of pedo-activists, that "verification" has simply consisted in the mutual exchange of illegal "kiddy porn". Cops can legally share porn in the course of their investigations!
Now, my idea of "verification" would be to subtly arrange a situation where the "suspect" would have to engage in actual sexual contact, preferably with "a boy who the 'suspect' had claimed to really like". If the "suspect" refused to go along, or (when surreptitiously monitored) was shown not to respond sexually, that would be a much stronger "proof". I mean, something like, "You like Timmy? Well, he likes you, too. So why don't you two just toddle off into the bedroom, while I go out and run some errands." You, of course, would film whatever activity did (or did not) take place. If the guy wouldn't blow the kid when he had the chance, well -- that about says it all, doesn't it? User4 (talk) 22:57, 22 March 2015 (UTC)
Why are all these precautions necessary, if we use proper computer security? Lysander (talk) 23:47, 22 March 2015 (UTC)